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and 
Department of Mathematics 
University of Nijmegen 
Nijmegen, The N ether lands 
A survey is given of combinatorial optimization game theory. In more detail flow 
games and linear production games are treated . 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the early developments of Operations Research and Game Theory there was 
an lnteresting interaction between the two fields. This is not surprising, because in both 
fields decision makers, guided by an objective function, want to act in an optimal way. 
The main difference between the fields is that in O.R. there is acting only one decision 
maker, while in game theory at least two decision makers are in interaction. 
Game theory deals with mathematica! models of competition and cooperation. 
Roughly speaking the theory is divided into two parts: non-cooperative theory, where 
the players (agents, decision makers) cannot make binding agreements and cooperative 
theory where binding agreements and often also sidepayments are pos.5ible. 
Well-known is the interrelation between 0.R. and non-cooperative game theory. 
We only mention: 
(i) Duality results in mathematica! programming theory and minimax results in zero-
sum game t heory. 
(ii) Linear complementarity theory and the theory of bimatrix games. 
(iii) Markov decision theory and the theory of stochastic games. 
(iv) Optimal control theory and the theory of differential games. 
Interrelation between cooperative game theory and O.R. is less known and it is the 
purpose of this paper to pay some attent ion to this interrelation. We will introd uce 
cooperative games arising from optimization situations, in which many decision makers 
are involved, because they own e.g. resources or arcs in a network, or because they 
control pieces of networks etc. In working together, the decision makers create extra 
gains or save costs and the problem arises: how to share the extra rewards or how to 
allocate the costs? One way, to answer this question is to look at TU-games (transferable 
utility games) arising from such situations and to use existing solution concepts or to 
create new suitable solution concepts to solve the problem. 
Since the beginning of the seventies many situations are considered. I mention: 
(i) Minimum spanning tree games and spanning network games ( Claus and Kleitman 
(1973), Bird {1976), Megiddo (1978}, Granot and Huberman (1981), Granot and 
Maschler (1991), van den Nouweland, Maschler and Tijs (1992)). 
(ii) Linear production games, LP-games and mathematica! programming games (Owen 
(1975), Dubey and Shapley (1984), Granot (1986), Potters (1987), Curiel, Pederzoli 
and Tijs (1988)) . 
(iii) Flow games (Kalai and Zemel (1982), Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989}, Derks and 
Tijs (1985, 1986)). 
(iv) 'fraveling salesman games (Potters, Curiel and Tijs {1992}, Tamir (1989}, Kuipers 
(1991) ). 
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(v) Sequencing games, permutation games and assignment games (Shapley and Shubik 
(1972), Curiel, Pederzoli and Tijs (1989), Curiel and Tijs (1986), Potters a.nd Tijs 
{1987), Hamers, Borm and Tijs (1992)). 
For further reading I recommend Curiel {1987, 1988), Driessen {1988), Sharkey 
(1992) and Tijs and Dries.5en (1986). 
In the next sections we introduce some of these clas.5e5 of games, a.nd indicate some 
main results. 
Section 2 gives a short introduction into cooperative game theory. Especially, at-
tention is paid there to the care and in examples minimum spanning tree games, and 
traveling sa.lesman games are introduced. 
Section 3 deals mainly with max flow games. 
In section 4 linear prod uction sit uations and their corresponding games are consid-
ered in detail, as well as permutation games. 
An extensive list of references will guide the reader through the literature . 
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2. COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY 
Cooperative game theory is concerned primarily with coalitions - groups of players 
- who coordinate their actions and pool their winnings. For each set S of players, 
v(S) denotes the amount they can gain if they form a coalition, excluding the other 
players. One of the problems is how to divide extra earnings (or cost savings) arnong 
the members of the formed coalition. 
For N = { 1, 2, ... , n} denote the collection of subsets of N by 2N . 
Deflnition 2.1. A cooperative n-person game in characteristic function /01,n is an 
ordered pair < N, v >, where N := { 1, 2, ... , n} (the set of players) and v : 2N • R 
is a map, as.5igning to each coalition S E 2N a real number, such that v(0) = 0. The 
function v is called the characteristic function of the game, v(S) is called the worth (or 
value) of coalition S. 
Example 2.2. (Three cooperating communities.) Communities 1, 2 and 3 want to be 
connected with a nearby power source. The possible transmission links and their casts 
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are shown in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1. 
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The cost game < N, c > associated with this sit uation is given by N = { 1, 2, 3} and the 
first two lines of the ncxt table. 
S= 0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} 
c(S) = 0 100 90 80 130 110 110 140 
v(S) 0 0 0 0 60 70 60 130 
The game < N, v > in the third line of the table is the cost savings game corresponding 
to < N, c >, determined by 
v(S) := L c(i) - c(S) for each SE 2N . 
iES 
The cost savings v( S) for coalition S is the difference in costs corresponding to the 
situation where all members of S work alone and the situation where all members of S 
wor k toget her. 
Games arising from situations as in example 2.2 for obvious reasons are called 
minimum spanning tree games. Tl1ey are extensively studied. For a survey I refer to 
Sharkey (1992) . 
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Example 2.3 (Saving travel casts) . 
1 70 
80 . 2 
Home city "O 
50~ 
60 
Figure 2.2. 
Three university cities 1, 2 and 3 are interested in inviting a scientist living in 
{home) city 0 . In figure 2.2 the one way travel casts are given. So going from city O to 
city 1 and back casts 2 x 50 = 100 units etc. In cooperating the cities can save travel 
costs. The problem is: ''who pays what to the scientist?'' . In the next table you find 
the corresponding cost game and cost savings game . 
.. 
s 0 {1} {2} {3} {1,2} {1,3} {2,3} {1,2,3} 
c(S) 0 100 160 100 200 140 190 230 
v(S) 0 0 0 0 60 60 70 130 
Games arising from situations as in example 2.3 are called traveling salesman games. 
For recent results I refer to Potters and Tijs {1992), Potters {1990), Tamir {1989) and 
Kuipers ( 1991 ) . 
Example 2.4. N = { 1, 2,, 3}, v(S) = 1 if S ::J {2, 3}, v(S) = 0 otherwise. This is an 
example of a simple game, where v(S) E {O, 1} for all S and v(N) = 1. Such games 
play a role in the description of voting situations, where v(S) = 1 ◄; > S is winning. 
Also in control situations of an object simple games are useful in the description of those 
coalitions who can use the object i.e. those coalitions with worth 1. In the game in this 
example coalitions containing players 2 and 3 are powerful. Another simple game is the 
dictator game < N, <5i >, whcre IJi(S) = 1 iff i ES. 
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For a game < N, v > interesting distributions (x1, x2, . .. , Xn) of the worth v(N) 
of the grand coalition are core elements, satisfying: 
n 
(i) Ex, = v(N) (Pareto efficiency) 
i=l 
(ii) E x, ~ v(S) for all S E 2N (Stability) 
iES 
The set of vectors satisfying (i) and (ii) is called the core of the game and is denoted by 
C(v). If x E C(v), then no coalition S has an incentive to split off, if x is the proposed 
reward allocation for N, because the total amount E Xi allocated to S is not smaller 
iES 
than the amount v(S) which they can obtain by forming a subcoalition. 
For the game in figure 2.1 the vector (70, 60, 0) E C( v), which corresponds to the 
vector (30, 30, 80) in the cost core, which is defined by 
n 
C(c) := {x E RN I L Xi = c(N), L Xi ~ c(S) for all S} . 
i=l iES 
This vector (30, 30, 80) is tightly related to the minimum spanning tree, corresponding 
to this problem. 
It is well-known that all minimum cost spanning tree games have a non-empty core. 
For the game < N, v > in example 2.3 the vector ( 40, 40, 50) is in the core. However, 
there exist traveling salesman games with an empty core (cf. Potters and Tijs (1992)). 
In view of a famous theorem concerning necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the non-emptiness of the core (Bondareva (1963) and Shapley (1967)), games with a 
non-empty core are also called balanced games. The core is one of the most interesting 
solution concepts. Others are e.g. the Shapley value (1953), the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 
1969), the ,-value (Tijs, 1981). 
In Curiel, Pederwli and Tijs (1989) for sequencing games an interesting rule, the Equal 
Gain Splitting Rule, was introduced, which fits nicely with these cl~ of games. 
In the following sections only the core will be considered, and most of the considered 
games will be balanced. 
3. FLOW GAMES 
Nice examples of balanced games are those arising from flow situations witl1 veto 
control. In the flow sit uation there is one source and one sink and on the arcs there are 
capacity restrictions. Furthermore, with the aid of a simple game for each are, one can 
describe which coalitions are allowed to use the are. These are the coalitions which are 
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winning in the simple game. In this context such games are called control games. The 
value of a coalition S is the maximal flow through the network from source to sink (per 
time unit), where one uses only arcs which are controlled by S. 
Example 3.1. Consider the network in Figure 3.1 with one source, one sink, one 
intermediate node w here 
W\ 
10 
source 
Figure 3.1. 
the three arcs l1,l2,l3 have capacities 4, 5 and 10 respectively. 
The control games are w1, tt'2, w3 with 
w1(S) = 1 if SE { {l, 2}, N} and w1(S) = 0 otherwise 
w2(S) = 1 if SE { {l, 3}, N} and w2(S) = 0 otherwise 
W3 = 61, player 1 owns are l3 
• 
sink 
The coalition {l, 2} can only use the arcs 11 and l3, so the maxima! flow (per time unit) 
for {1,2} is 4. This results in v({l,2}} = 4 for the corresponding flow game< N,v >, 
whose characteristic function is given by 
v({i}) = 0 if i EN, v({l,2}} = 4, v({l,3}) = 5 
v( {2, 3}) = 0 and v(N) = 9. 
A minimum cut for the flow sit uation corresponding to the grand coalition is { l 1, l2}. By 
the max-flow min-cut theorem of Ford and Fulkerson (1962) the sum of the capacities 
of l 1 and l2 ( 4 + 5) is equal to v(N). Divide v(N) as follows. Divide 4 equally among 
the veto players of w 1, and 5 equally among the veto players of w2. The result for the 
players is the payoff vector (4½, 2, 24). Note that this vector is in C(v). 
The next theorem shows that the non-emptiness of the core of the control games 
is inherited by the flow game. 
• 
Theorem 3.2. ( Cf. Curiel, Derks and Tijs ( 1989)) Suppose all control games in a 
controlled flow sit uation have veto players. Then the flow game is balanced. 
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Proof. Take a maximal flow for the grand coalition and a minimum cut in the network 
for the grand coalition consisting of the arcs 
l 1, l2, .. . , l.,, with capacities c1, c2, ... , Cp 
and control games w1 , w2 , . .. , w.,,, respectively. Then the theorem of Ford-Fulkerson 
says that v(N) = L~=l Cr· For each r take xr E core(wr) and divide Cr according to 
the division key xr (i.e. crxr is the amount for player i) . Note that non-veto players 
get not hing. Then L~- 1 CrX r E C ( v) because 
n p 'P n 'P 
(i) L L c,-xr = L c,- L xr = L c,- = v(N) 
i=lr=l r= l i=l r=l 
( ii) For each coalition S, the set 
L S : = { lr I r E { 1, . .. , p}, Wr ( S) = 1} 
is a cut of the network, governed by the coalition S . 
'P p 
Hence, E ( E CrX[) = L c,- E xr ~ L CrWr(S) = L c,- = capacity (Ls) ~ v(S) 
iES r-1 r=l iES r=l lrELs 
where the last inequality follows from the Ford-Fulkerson theorem. 
The question arises whether any non-negative game can be obtained from a flow 
situation with veto control (i.e. all control games possess veto players). The affirmative 
• • • answer lS g1ven 1n 
Theorem 3.3. Any non-negative balanced game arises from a flow situation with veto 
control. 
Proof. Let v be such a game. By a theorem of Derks ( 1987) there are positive numbers 
k 
ei, c2, ... , Ck and balanced simple games w1, w2, . .. , Wk such that v = L CrWr , Take 
• - 1 
the flow situation as 
source 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Figure 3.2. 
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sink 
• 
• 
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in figure 3. 2 with no intermediate nodes and arcs l 1, l2, ... , l1c from source to sink with 
capacities c1, c2, ... , Ck and control games w1, tL-'2, ... , Wk respectively. Then, one can 
easily prove that the corresponding flow game coincides with < N, v >. 
Remark 3.4. (Cf. Kalai and Zemel {1982a, 1982b).) Let < N, v > be the flow game 
corresponding to a flow situation where all control games are dictatorial games. Then 
it is easy to prove that each subgame < S, v. > (where v. is the restriction of v to 
25 ) has a non-empty core. (Such games are called totally balanced). For extensions to 
multi-commodity flow games sec Derks and Tijs {1985, 1986) . 
Remark 3.5. In this section we looked at the class of rnax flow games. Interesting is 
also the class of minimum cost flow games, which can be seen to contain assignment 
games (Shapley and Shubik, 1972) and permutation games (Tijs et al, 1984). We will 
not treat this class here. 
4. LINEAR PRODUCT GAMES 
Linear production games are introduced by Owen {1975). Generalizations of Owen's 
results are given in Dubey and Shapley {1984), Granot (1986) and Curiel, Derks and 
Tijs (1989). 
Consider the linear production situation where products Pi, P2, ... , P;, ... , Pm can 
be made using resources G 1, G2, ... , Gk, ... , G9 . Suppose that for the production of o 
units of Pi(a ~ O)oai1 units of G 1, oaj2 units of G2, . . . , are req11ired. Furthermore, 
the price per unit of product Pi is Cj, Let A := (ajk]~ 1,t=t be the corresponding 
production matrix. We suppose that A ~ 0 and that each row of A has a positive 
coordinate. If a bundle of b E ni of resources is available, then feasible production 
plans can be described as vectors x E R+ with xA ~ b, where x corresponds to the 
plan: make for each j E { 1, 2, .. . , m} x i units of product Pi. The val ue of the prod ucts 
made by such a plan at price c is equal to the inner product x · c of x and c. 
Let 
val ( b) : = max { x · c I x ~ 0, x A $ b} 
be the value corresponding to an optima! production plan, given the resource bundle b. 
That val(b) is well-defined follows from the fact that {x ~ 0, xA $ b} is a compact set, 
in view of the conditions put on A. 
Now suppose that a group N = { 1, 2, ... , n} of agents controls in some way the 
resou,rces and that b(S) is the resource bundle which is available toa coalition SE 2N, 
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provided they cooperate. Then the above situation corresponds to a linear production 
game < N, v >, where 
v(S) := val(b(S)) for each SE 2N\ {0}. 
The papers of Owen (1975), Granot (1986) and Curiel, Derks and Tijs (1989} give 
sufficient conditions for the map S -+ b(S) to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core 
of the corresponding linear prod uction game. 
Example 4.1. Consider the linear production situation 
G1 G2 
P1 1 2 
P2 2 1 
b1 = (5, 8) 
b2 = (5, 2) 
b3 = (0, 2) 
Table 4.1. 
5 
7 
as given in table 4.1, where 2 resources G1 and G2 are involved and 2 products P1 and 
P2 , with prices per unit 5 and 7. Suppose that 10 units of G1 and 12 units of G2 are 
available: player 1, 2 and 3 own, respectively, resolrrce bundles (5,8), (5,2} and (0,2}. 
This situation corresponds toa 3-person linear production game< N, v > with 
where b,c(S) = (EieS bi)k for k E {1, 2} denotes the total amount of resource G1c owned 
by coalition S. 
If one wishes to calculate v, rather than (4.1) it is easier to use formula (4.2), which is 
derlved from the duality theorem of linear programming theory. The reason is that for 
all dual programs corresponding to the 2n - 1 = 7 coalitions the feasible region is the 
same. We have 
v(S) = min{b1(S)y1 + ~(S)y2 1 Yt ~ 0, Y2 ~ 0, Yt + 2y2 ~ 5, 2y1 + 1/2 ~ 7} (4.2} 
• 
The feasible region of the dual problem has 3 extreme points, namely i) = (3, 1}, f)' = 
(5, O}, fl'' = {O, 7). For each of the 7 problems in (4.2} the minimum is attained at one 
of these extreme points. The next table 4.2 describes where the minimum is attained 
and gives also the characteristic function v. 
10 
' I
' J 
s b(S) • • v(S) rrun1mum 
(1) (5,8) .... 23 y 
(2) (5,2) .... ,, y 14 
l 
(3) (0, 2) ... , y 0 
(1, 2} (10, 10} ... 40 y 
(1, 3) (5, 10} ....... , Y,Y 25 
(2,3) (5,4) .... 19 ~ y 
{1,2,3) (10, 12} .... 42 y 
Table 4.2. 
For the grand coalition N the value is equal to 42 and is attained at fl = (3, l}. Here, 
3 can be interpreted as ( shadow) price for G 1 . According to these prices the bundle 
b1 = (5, 8), owned by player 1, has value 5 · 3 + 8 · 1 = 23. For players 2 and 3 the values 
of their bundles are 17 and 2 respectively. These values correspond to the imputation 
(23,17,2} of< N, v >. Note that (23, 17, 2) is even a core element of< N, v > and that 
to find this vector we only need to solve the dual linear program in {4.2) for S = N. 
In the Owen model each player i owns a bundle bi = (bi, b~, ... , b~) of resources 
and b(S) := EiES bi for each SE 2N\{0}. An example is given in 4.1. 
In the Granot model one considers the q commodity games< N, Ck > with ck(S) := 
bk(S) and assumes that these games are balanced. 
In the Curiel-Derks-Tijs model for each commodity Gk there are portions Okt, Ok2, 
.. . , Okt(k) available, where the control of these portions is described by control games 
Wkt, Wk2, ... , Wkt(k) respectively. One assumes that the control games are simple games 
with veto players. Hence, bk(S) = E~~l OkrWkr(S) for each S. (See example 4.4.) 
. n . 
Note that in the Owen model bk(S) = EiES bk = Li=l bköi(S) for all k E N and 
S E 2N \ { 0}, where Öi is the dictator game with dictator i. This implies that this model 
is a special case of the third model by taking for each k E {1, ... , q} : t(k) = n, and for 
each i E N : Oki = b~, Wki = bi. 
The Granot model can also be incorporated in the third model, since by a theorem 
of Derks (1987) each of the non-negative balanced commodity games Ck can be written 
in the form Ck = Lr-l OkrWkr, where Okr > 0 and Wkr is a balanced simple game. 
Conversely, the third model can also be seen as a special case of the second model by 
noting that in the third model, for each k, S-+ bk(S) = E~~{ OkrWkr(S) is a balanced 
game, because balanced games forma cone. 
All the three models give rise to balanced linear production games. In view of the 
above we only need to prove this for the third model. 
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Theorem 4.2. (Curiel-Derks-Tijs (1989).) Consider the linear production game 
< N, v > corresponding to the linear production situation with production matrix 
A E nmxq, price c E nm and commodity function b : 2N\ {0} --+ Rq such that for all 
k E { 1, 2, .. . , q} and all S E 2N \ { 0} : 
t(k) 
bk(S) = L O:krWkr(S) 
r=l 
where all O:kr are positive real numbers and all Wkr are simple games with veto players. 
Then 
(i) < N, v > is a balanced game. 
(ii) A core element x of < N, v > can be obtained by taking 
q t(k) 
X = L L O:krYklV(k, r)l - leV(k,r) {4.3) 
k=l r=l 
where V(k, r) is the set of veto players in Wkr, y is an optimal vector in the dual 
program 4.2 with S = N and e8 is the vector in RN with coordinate ef = 1 if i E S 
and ef = 0 if i r/: S. 
Proof. We only need to show that x given by ( 4.3) is a core element. 
(i) 
i=l i=l k=l r=l 
q t(k) n 
= L LYkO:kr L IV(k, r)l- 1eY(k,r) 
k= l r=l i=l 
q t(k) q 
= L LYkO:kr = LYkbk(N) = il· b(N) = v(N) 
k=lr=l k= l 
where the last equality follows from ( 4.2) . 
(ii) Now take S C N , Sf= 0. First note that fl is feasible for the dual program in (4.2) 
corresponding to S. He nee, 
q q t(k) 
v(S) ~ L bk(S)iJk = L Yk(L O:JcrWkr(S)) 
k=l k=l r-1 
q t(k) 
~ L 1Îk L O:krlV(k, r)1- 11s n vk,rl 
k=l r-1 
q t(k) 
= L L L O:krYklV(k, r)l- 1eY(k,r) 
iESk= lr=l 
12 
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So x E C(v). 
Note that the core element x in theorem 4.2 is obtained as follows. 
(i) First calculate shadow prices Y1, ... , 'Yq for the commodities by solving the linear 
program ( 4.2} for the grand coalition. 
(ii) With respect to the shadow price 1Jk the portion O:kr has value O:krYk• Divide this 
amount equally among the veto players in the game Wkr which describes the control 
of the portion O:kr· 
(iii) To find Xi add the amount obtained by i over all portions. 
Remark 4.3. Consider the third model where the value O:kr'Yk is divided equally among 
the veto players in Wkr · We change the situation and take as division key for OkrYk a 
core element zkr of Wkr i.e. player i obtains from O:kr'Yk the amount O:kr1JkZfr. It is then 
easy to prove that this procedure also leads toa core element x of the linear production 
game, where 
q t(k) 
- "" ,.. kr X = 0 ~0:krYkZ • 
k=l r=l 
Example 4.4. Consider the linear production situation given in table 4.3 where there 
are 2 products and 2 resources. There are 3 players involved, player 1 owns 4 units of 
G 1 , and 6 units of G 1 are controlled by the unanimity game u{2,3}. The control of the 
12 available units of G2 is described by the control game w with w( 1, 2) = w(l, 2, 3} = 
1, w( S) = 0 otherwise. 
Then 
G1 G2 
P1 1 3 
P2 4 2 
(10 12) 
î î 
4 
61 12 
6 w 
U(2,3} 
Table 4.3. 
30 
40 
v( {l, 2, 3}) = min{lOy1 + 12y2 1 Yt, Y2 2: 0, Yt + 3y2 2: 30, 4y1 + 2y2 2: 40} 
= ( 10, 12) (ü1, ü2) with 111 = 6, 112 = B 
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The first port ion 4 of G 1 has (shadow )value 4 · 6 = 24 going to player 1. The second 
portion 6 of g1 has value 36, where player 2 and 3 get each 18 units. The 12 units of 
G 2 have value 12 · 8 = 96 and are divided equally among the veto players 1 and 2. This 
results in the core element 
(24, 0, 0) + (0, 18, 18) + ( 48, 48, 0) = (72, 66, 18) 
of the corresponding linear production game. For this linear production game v we have 
v(l, 2} = 120, v(N) = 156 and v(S) = 0 otherwise. 
In case we have a linear production situation with some portions of resources con-
trolled by committees where there are no veto players, then not necessarily the corre-
sponding linear production game is balanced. One can stabilize the situation e.g. by 
replacing the control games with empty cores by so called corresponding tax games and 
then use a core element of these tax games as a division key for the value of such a 
portion. This is done in Curiel, Pederwli and Tijs (1988). 
Linear production games can be seen as special cases of linear programming games 
(cf. Dubey and Shapley (1984), Granot (1986)) which arise from linear programming 
situations described by an m x q-matrix A = [Oi;)~1 ,J=1 , c E nm and a function 
b : 2N\ {0} • R9 which are such that for all S E 2N\ {0} the set { xA S b(S), x ~ O} 
is non-empty and x -+ x · c is bounded from above on this set. The corresponding 
LP-game < N, v > is given by 
v ( S) : = max { x · c I x A S b( S), x ~ 0} 
= min{b(S) · y I Ay ~ c, y ~ O} 
Theorem 4.5. Let A, b, c be as above. Suppose that, for each j E { 1, . . . , q}, the core 
of< N, {31 > is non-empty, where {3j(0) = 0 and 
(4.4) 
Then the LP-game < N, v > has a non-empty core. Moreover, if zi E C({31) for each j 
and il E Rq is such that 
b( N) · y = v ( N), Ay ~ c, y ~ 0 
14 
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Proof. Note that fi is feasible in the dual of the LP-problem determining v(S) and 
optimal in the dual LP-program determining v(N). This implies that 
n n q q q 
Lxi = LLiiizi = Liii/3i(N) = Liiibi(N) = v(N) 
i=l i=l j=l j=l j=l 
q q 
L Xi = L iii L zi ~ L üi/3i(S) = b(S) · fi ~ v(S). 
iES j=l iES j=l 
Hence, x is a core element of< N, v >. 
Remark 4.6. Let A, b, c be as above and let D be an m x r-matrix. Consider LP-games 
< N,v > with 
v(S) := max{x · c I xA ~ b(S), xD = 0, x ~ O} 
(i) It is easy to prove that such LP-games have a non-empty core if the corresponding 
games /31,/32, . . . ,/3q, as defined in (4.4), have a non-empty core. 
(ii) Flow games arising from flow situations with veto control, as in section 3, can be 
seen as LP-games of the above type. This leads to another proof of theorem 3. 2. 
Now we introd uce permutation games and show that these games are balanced by 
showing that they can be seen as LP-games. For that purpose we need the theorem 
of Birkhoff (1948) - von Neumann (1953) on the extreme points of doubly stochastic 
matrices. 
Theorem 4.7. Let 
be the convex set of doubly stochastic n x n-matrices. Let 
PERMn :={DE DSn I dii E {O, 1} for all i,j EN} 
be the set of permutation matrices. Then Dsn is the convex hull of PERMn . 
Consider the following situation ( cf. Tijs, Parthasarathy, Potters and Rajendra 
Prasad (1984).) 
(i) There are n persons 1, 2, ... , n and each person i, 1 ~ i ~ n, possesses a machine 
Mi and has a job Ji to be processed. 
(ii) Each machine Mi can process any job Ji, hut no machine is allowed to procesc, 
more than one job. 
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(iii) Coalition formation and sidepayments are allowed. 
(iv) If a person does not cooperate, his job has to be proces.5ed on hls own machine. 
(v) The cost of processing job Ji on machine Mi equals ki;, where 1 ~ i, j ~ n. 
This situation can be reduced to the n-person cost game < N, c > where for each 
coalition SE 2N\ {0}: 
c(S) = mJn L kiu(i) 
iES 
(4.5) 
with the minimum taken over all S-permutations u : S • S. Such au corresponds to 
a plan where job Ji of player i E Sis processed on machine Mu(i) of player u{i). The 
game defined by ( 4.5) is called the pe1~riutation game, corresponding to the cost matrix 
K = [ki;]i=l ,j=l · 
We want to prove that the core 
n 
C(c) := {x E Rn I Lxi = c(N), Lxi ~ c(S) for all SE 2N} 
i=l iES 
of such permutation game is non-empty by reducing such a game to an LP-game as in 
theorem 4.5. But let us first give an example. 
Example 4.8. Consider the 3-person permutation game < N, c > with cost matrix 
K= 
1 2 
3 6 
4 8 
3 
9 
12 
• 
Then < N, c > and the corresponding cost savings game < N, w > are given in table 4.4. 
It follows e.g. that c{l, 2) = min{ 1 + 6, 3 + 2} = 5, corresponding to the costs incurred 
when job J1 (J2) is processed on machine M2 (M1). Note that (-2, 6, 9) E C(c) and 
(3,0,3) E C(w). 
s 0 {l) (2) 
c(S) 0 1 6 
w(S) 0 0 0 
(3) (1, 2) 
12 5 
0 2 
Table 4.4 
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(1, 3) (2,3) (1,2,3) 
7 17 13 
6 1 6 
' 
• 
Denote the standard inner product of 2 n x n-matrices A = [a.i]i=:1 •i=l and B = 
(bii]?=t•J=l by A • B. Hence, A * B := L~=l I:;=t llijbij• For SE 2N\{0} let 
Then ( 4.5) can be rewritten as 
c(S) = min{K *PI P E PERM5}. 
To prove that C(c) -f. 0, it is sufficient to show th.at for the reward game < N, v >, 
where v = -c, the core is non-empty. We can prove this last fact by showing that 
< N, v > is an LP-game as in theorem 4.5. 
Note that for each SE 2N\ {0}: 
v(S) = max{{-K) *PI P E PERM5} 
= max{(-K) * D I D ~ 0, eN D $ e5 , -eN D $ -es, DeN $es, -DeN $ -es} 
where the second equality follows from the Birkhoff - von Neumann theorem. But then 
one easily shows that < N, v > is an LP-game (with m = q = n 2 ). Finally, theorem 4.9 
follows from theorem 4.5 by noting that the games < N, /3i > are additive. 
Theorem 4.9. Permutation games are (totally) balanced games. 
For further information on permutation games and related assignment games we 
refer to Shapley and Shubik (1972), Curiel-Tijs (1986) and Potters-Tijs (1987). 
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